

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 ACDA-19 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 DODE-00 SS-20 NSC-07 OIC-04 CU-04 DRC-01 /140 W

----- 121729

R 161310Z MAY 74

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5796

INFO ALL CSCE CAPITALS 140

AMEMBASSY OSLO

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USLO SACLANT NORFOLK VA

USDOCOSOUTH

CINCLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 3060

VIENNA ALSO FOR MBFR DELEGATION

EO 11652 GDS

TAGS PFOR PARM

SUBJ CSCE: MILITARY SECURITY

1. SUMMARY: SOVIET REP (AMB. MENDELEVICH) ON MAY 15 SET STAGE FOR SECOND READING OF DOCUMENT ON MILITARY SECURITY IN LONG PRESENTATION BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE. WHILE LAYING OUT WELL-KNOWN SOVIET POSITIONS ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, HE SAID THERE WAS SOME ROOM FOR COMPROMISE IF ITS WAS CORRECTLY FORMULATED AND AVOIDED RIGID RULES. MAIN THEME WAS THAT CBMS SHOULD BE BASED ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF EACH CSCE PARTICIPANT AND THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DESTROY THE MILITARY BALANCE WHICH PRESENTLY EXISTS IN EUROPE. WITH REGARD TO THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS, MENDELEVICH SAID THE TIME WAS NOT RIPE FOR SUCH CONSIDERATION. SEVERAL ALLIES REPLIED BY EXPRESSING DISAPPOINTMENT

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IN THE LACK OF PROGRESS ON MILITARY SECURITY AND

DEPLORED THE LIMITED APPROACH OF THE SOVIETS TO CBMS. END SUMMARY.

2. MENDELEVICH SPOKE INITIALLY FOR MORE THAN ONE HOUR ON MAY 15 BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY SECURITY AND SPELLED OUT THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THE SECOND READING OF THE DRAFT TEXT. THE DRAFT TEXT, HE SAID, REFLECTED NOTHING BUT DISAGREEMENTS, WAS FULL OF ILLUSORY IDEAS AND TOTALLY UNSATISFACTORY PROPOSALS. SUBCOMMITTEE HAD IGNORED FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF TRUTH. MAIN DIFFICULTY WAS THAT THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE IN PRINCIPLE. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE APPROACH TO CBMS WAS TO ENSURE THAT THEY SAFEGUARDED THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS AND THAT THEY "DISPERSE ANXIETIES." CBMS SHOULD NOT LEAD TO CHANGES IN THE PRESENT SYSTEMS OF ADMINISTRATION AND TRAINING OF ARMED FORCES AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF EACH STATE. CBMS SHOULD NOT BE FORMULATED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY WOULD AFFECT THE SOVEREIGNTY OF ANY ONE STATE IN THE SECURITY AREA.

3. WHILE STRESSING THAT THERE WAS ROOM FOR COMPROMISE IN THE SECOND ROUND, MENDELEVICH UNDERLINED THE VOLUNTARY CHARACTER OF CBMS. HE SAID THAT EACH STATE, AT ITS OWN DISCRETION, SHOULD DECIDE WHICH MEASURES IT COULD APPROPRIATELY TAKE UNDER A MORAL AND POLITICAL COMMITMENT WHICH DID NOT REQUIRE NEGOTIATED CONTROLS. RIGID RULES HAD TO BE AVOIDED. CBMS MUST BE BASED ON EXISTING PRACTICES AS A FOUNDATION FOR BUILDING IN THE FUTURE AND ONLY EXPERIENCE COULD TELL IF THESE WOULD BE MERIT IN EXTENDING THESE MEASURES. HE SAID A PERIOD OF 5-7 YEARS MIGHT BE NEEDED TO DETERMINE THE VALUE OF EXTENDING CBMS. CONFIDENCE COULD NOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR SECURITY. THE PRESENT STATE OF POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS IN EUROPE DID NOT PERMIT SUCH SUBSTITUTION.

4. MENDELEVICH THEN PROCEEDED TO OUTLINE SOVIET POSITION ON CBMS AS FOLLOWS. PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO MAJOR MANEUVERS OF ARMY OR ARMY CORPS SIZE. MANEUVERS INVOLVING BATTALIONS, REGIMENTS AND DIVISIONS DO NOT CAUSE ANXIETY. NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE CONFINED TO BORDER AREAS AND WIDTH OF ZONE CAN BE NEGOTIATED. USSR
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IS PREPARED TO ESTABLISH A SPECIFIED ZONE OR BELT. NO AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE ON MANEUVERS CONDUCTED IN THE INTERIOR SINCE SUCH MANEUVERS DO NOT CREATE FEARS. THE PERIOD FOR NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING SECURITY INTERESTS AND FIVE DAYS HAS BEEN SUGGESTED. A LONGER OR SHORTER PERIOD MIGHT BE DISCUSSED. A PERIOD OF WEEKS OR MONTHS IS SIMPLY NOT NECESSARY. ON WHO IS TO BE NOTIFIED, MENDELEVICH SAID ONLY THE STATE CONCERNED

WHICH WOULD IN MOST CASES BE A NEIGHBOR. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, BE POSSIBLE TO NOTIFY ALL STATES IN CASES INVOLVING MANEUVERS OF SEVERAL COUNTRIES. CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE LIMITED TO SCOPE, SIZE, PERIOD AND AREA WHERE MANEUVER IS TO BE CONDUCTED. HE CONCLUDED REMARKS ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS BY SAYING THAT CRITERIA ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE. AS DETENTE FLOURISHES, CRITERIA CAN BE DEVELOPED FURTHER. IF PARTICIPANTS DESIRED OTHER CRITERIA NOW, THEN THEY SHOULD BE DEVELOPED ON A BILATERAL BASIS. THERE COULD WELL BE REGIONAL SITUATIONS WHICH CALLED FOR MORE DEFINITIVE UNDERSTANDINGS BUT THE SUBCOMMITTEE COULD NOT CONCERN ITSELF WITH SUCH MATTERS SINCE IT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEVELOPING A GENERAL FORMULA TO BE APPLIED TO ALL.

5. MENDELEVICH MADE A PASSING REFERENCE TO THE EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS BY OBSERVING THAT THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON MANY POINTS. THE ONLY OBSTACLES TO AGREEMENT WERE ARTIFICIAL.

6. ON THE MOVEMENTS QUESTION, MENDELEVICH SAID THAT THE PRESENT STATE OF MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT IN EUROPE DOES NOT ALLOW FOR THE ELABORATION OF SUCH MEASURES. THE TIME IS NOT YET RIPE FOR A DECISION. THE DESIRE FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS IS UTOPIAN. THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT SUCH MEASURES MAY NEVER BE CONSIDERED. MOVEMENTS CAN BE DISCUSSED AT LATER TALKS WHEN THE CLIMATE OF DETENTE HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED. THIS IS A SUBJECT FOR FOLLOW-UP.

7. IRELAND LEAD OFF THE COMMENTS FOR THE WEST EXPRESSING DISAPPOINTMENT OVER PROGRESS SO FAR. FRG, UK, MALTA, NETHERLANDS AND CANADA MADE COMMENTS OF VARYING LENGTHS GENERALLY CRITICIZING RIGIDITY OF SOVIET POSITION. CANADA
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MADE TELLING POINT IN CRITICIZING SOVIET ATTACHMENT TO NATIONAL SECURITY RATHER THAN PEACE AND STABILITY. MENDELEVICH HAD LAST WORD IN FINAL THIRTY-MINUTE EXPOSITION OF SOVIET DETERMINATION NOT TO UPSET MILITARY BALANCE. CBMS, HE CONCLUDED, COULD BE AGREED TO WITHOUT LIQUIDATING MILITARY ALLIANCES AND THIS IS PRESENT SOVIET APPROACH.

8. COMMENT: SOVIET POSITION ON SECURITY CONTENT FOR CSCE HAS NOT CHANGED SINCE THE EASTER BREAK, AND ALLIED AND NEUTRAL DESIRES FOR MORE SPECIFICITY IN CBMS IMPLY DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD. THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET PRESENTATION WAS THE SUGGESTION OF AN UNDERLYING FEAR THAT THROUGH CBMS THE WEST IS SEEKING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES. EFFORTS TO DISPEL THIS SOVIET SUSPICION HAS APPARENTLY FAILED. END COMMENT. ABRAMS

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